

2014 QDR

7 Mar 14

“Difficult Choices”



- “We chose further reductions in troop strength and force structure in every military service, active and reserve, in order to sustain our readiness and technological superiority, and to protect critical capabilities like Special Operations Forces and cyber resources.
- We chose to terminate or delay some modernization programs to protect higher priorities in procurement, research, and development.
- And we chose to slow the growth of military compensation costs in ways that will preserve the quality of the all-volunteer force, but also free up critical funds needed for sustaining training, readiness, and modernization.
- But also, “We seek a highly ready and capable Army, able to dominate any opponent across the full spectrum of operations.”

SecDef Chuck Hagel

February 24, 2014

QDR Report

What it is:


- The Secretary of Defense's strategy & direction for the Armed Forces for the next 20 years
- Identification of "leading edge investments"
- The Secretary of Defense's objectives & priorities (top-down direction)

What it isn't:

- Comprehensive list of decisions
- Programmatic or budget guidance
- A consensus document (bottom-up process) or a compilation of Service / Agency quadrennial defense reviews

Strategy

Resources



QDR Legislation -- 10 USC § 118



Paraphrase
of the
legislation



SecDef shall conduct a comprehensive examination of the **national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget plan** to establish a defense program **for the next 20 years**, identifying the **resources** required to execute successfully the **full range of missions** called for in that national defense strategy at a **low-to-moderate level of risk**, and any **additional resources** (beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk; and to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with and are **fully independent** of the budget submitted to Congress by the President.

National Defense Panel

Topics To Be Addressed

1. Strategy & force structure
 - *Best suited*
 - *Low-to-moderate risk*
2. National security interests
3. Threats & scenarios
4. Assumptions
5. Effects of Operations Other Than War & Small Scale Contingencies on high-intensity combat
6. Manpower & sustainment needed for conflicts lasting more than 120 days
7. RC roles & missions
8. Tooth-to-Tail ratio
 - *Size & number of HQ and Defense Agencies*
9. Specific Capabilities and Platforms needed
10. Lift required
 - *Strategic & tactical airlift*
 - *Sealift*
 - *Ground transportation*
11. Required forward presence & prepositioning
12. Inter-theater resource shifting
13. Unified Command Plan revisions
14. Effect on force structure of technologies
 - *Anticipated over next 20 years*
15. National defense mission of Coast Guard
16. Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions
 - *AC and RC*
17. Any other matter Secretary deems appropriate

Report to Congress due when President submits his budget request.

2014 National Defense Panel

- Concurrent with QDR.
- SecDef updates not less often than every 60 days or as requested.
- May request information directly from Defense components.

Co-Chairs



HON William J. Perry



**GEN John P. Abizaid
USA, Ret.**

Report NLT 3 months after SecDef QDR report.

- Review DOD terms of reference.
- Assess assumptions, strategy, findings, and risk.
- Independent assessment of possible force structures.
- Review resource requirements.
- Recommendations.

Appointed by:

SASC



HON Michele Flournoy



**Gen James Cartwright
USMC, Ret.**



**Gen Gregory Martin
USAF, Ret.**



**LTG Michael Maples
USA, Ret.**

HASC



**LTG Frank Kearney
USA, Ret.**



HON Jim Marshall




HON Eric Edelman



HON Jim Talent

2014 Quadrennial Defense Review




- Mandated by Congress – report due Feb 14.
- Retaining principal themes of the Jan 12 Defense Strategic Guidance.
- Building on 2013 Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR).
- Implementing the 2011 Budget Control Act.
- Focused on 5 issues:
 - ✓ **Strategy** (Defense Priorities) – what do we need to be able to do.
 - ✓ Integrated **Plans**, Presence, & Posture – how can we do it smarter.
 - ✓ Threats to the Homeland – our center of gravity, no longer a sanctuary.
 - ✓ Force-Sizing Construct – defining both **capability and capacity**.
 - ✓ Institutional Reform, Efficiencies, & Compensation – **freeing funds** for higher priorities.

1. Refined defense strategy.
2. New force-sizing construct.

2014 QDR - Table of Contents

- Secretary's Letter
- EXSUM
- Introduction
- Security Environment
- The Defense Strategy
 - ✓ Defense Strategy Pillars
 - ✓ Force Planning Construct
- Rebalancing the Joint Force
 - ✓ Service Force Structures
 - ✓ Protecting Key Priorities
- Rebalancing the Defense Institution
 - ✓ Health of the Force
 - ✓ Imperatives for Reform
- Implications and Risks of Prolonged Sequestration
- CJCS Assessment



Updated Defense Strategy

- The Department's defense strategy emphasizes three pillars:
 - ✓ Protect the homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters.
 - ✓ Build security globally, in order to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges.
 - ✓ Project power and win decisively, to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
- These pillars are mutually reinforcing and interdependent, and all of the military Services play important roles in each.




Force-Sizing Construct



- Reflecting the requirements of this updated defense strategy, the U.S. Armed Forces will be capable of simultaneously:
 - ✓ Defending the homeland;
 - ✓ Conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and ...
 - ✓ In multiple regions, detering aggression and assuring allies through forward presence and engagement.
- If deterrence fails at any given time, U.S. forces will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and denying the objectives of – or imposing unacceptable costs on – a second aggressor in another region.

The Army – Ground & Aviation



- The active Army will reduce from its war-time high force of 570,000 to 440,000-450,000 Soldiers.
- The Army National Guard will continue its downsizing from a war-time high of 358,000 to 335,000 Soldiers, and the U.S. Army Reserve will reduce from 205,000 to 195,000 Soldiers.
- If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY2016 and beyond, all components of the Army would be further reduced, with active duty end strength decreasing to 420,000, the Army National Guard drawing down to 315,000, and the Army Reserves reducing to 185,000.

Aviation



Consolidate & Remission



Retain & Realign



Retain



Retain & Remission



Divest



Divest



Divest

Selected Army Outcomes

- Reduces End strength: Regular Army 440-450k, Guard 335k, Reserve 195k, including aviation restructure
- Restates 2012 DSG force planning construct
 - ✓ No longer sized for large-scale prolonged stability ops
- Employs regionally-focused forces in supporting COCOM missions
- Deploys second forward-based missile defense radar to Japan
- Fields 7th Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery
- Grows overall SOF end strength
- Concludes Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) development at end of current technology phase
- Reduces major headquarters' budgets by 20%

Matching Capabilities to Challenges



“The Army has no wish to scrap its previous experience in favor of unproven doctrine, or in order to accommodate enthusiastic theorists having little or no responsibility for the consequences of following the courses of action they advocate. While the Army is adapting itself readily to the employment of new weapons and new techniques, **nothing currently available or foreseeable in war reduces the essentiality of mobile, powerful ground forces**, the only forces which can seize the enemy’s land and the people living thereon, and exercise control of both thereafter.”



General Matthew B. Ridgway
Chief of Staff, Army
June 27, 1955

Risk



The President's Budget provides the resources to build and sustain the capabilities to conduct these operations, although at increased levels of risk for some missions. With the President's Budget, our military will be able to defeat or deny any aggressor. Budget reductions inevitably reduce the military's margin of error in dealing with risks, and a smaller force strains our ability to simultaneously respond to more than one major contingency at a time. The Department can manage these risks under the President's FY2015 Budget plan, but the risks would grow significantly if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016, if proposed reforms are not accepted, or if uncertainty over budget levels continues.



The QDR asserts that the U.S. military can meet the updated national defense strategy, albeit at higher levels of risk in some areas. I want to highlight three main areas of higher risk:

- ✓ More Difficult Conventional Fights.
- ✓ Reliance on Allies and Partners.
- ✓ The Reality of Global Responsibilities.

Summary

- The US Armed Forces will:
 - ✓ Strengthen our alliances and partnerships.
 - ✓ Sustain our forward posture.
 - ✓ Be smaller, but more modern and able to project power over great distances and win decisively.
 - ✓ Restore readiness for the full spectrum of potential conflict.
 - ✓ Rebalance Regular (Active), Guard, and Reserve forces.
 - ✓ Seek innovative approaches to both institutional responsibilities and operational challenges.
 - ✓ Reduce costs in other areas (e.g., infrastructure, pay and compensation, health care) to fund forces and capabilities.

The 2014 QDR Continues . . .



Hon Buck McKeon (R-CA-25)
Chairman

Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives

“What’s wrong with the QDR for 2014:

- “Budget Driven: The FY14 QDR is heavily constrained by low budget levels. The law requires the QDR to identify resources not included in the Pentagon’s 5 year spending plan. The whole point of the review is to identify the budget needed to address the evolving threat.
- “Shortsighted: The FY14 QDR only looks out 5 years, instead of the 20 years required by law.
- “Assumes Too Much Risk: The law requires the QDR to offer a low-to-moderate risk plan for our forces and mission. By Secretary Hagel’s own admission, this QDR accepts additional risks.”

HASC Press Release
March 4, 2014